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Background: Military personnel in enclosed societies are at increased risk of respiratory infections. We inves-
tigated an outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 in a London Army barracks early in the pandemic.
Methods: Army personnel, their families and civilians had nasal and throat swabs for Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) by reverse transcriptase -polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR),
virus isolation and whole genome sequencing, along with blood samples for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. All tests
were repeated 36 days later.
Findings: During the first visit, 304 (254 Army personnel, 10 family members, 36 civilians, 4 not stated) par-
ticipated and 24/304 (8%) were SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR positive. Infectious virus was isolated from 7/24 (29%).
Of the 285 who provided a blood sample, 7% (19/285) were antibody positive and 63% (12/19) had neutralis-
ing antibodies. Twenty-two (22/34, 64%) individuals with laboratory-confirmed infection were asymptom-
atic. Nine SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR positive participants were also antibody positive but those who had
neutralising antibodies did not have infectious virus. At the second visit, no new infections were detected,
and 13% (25/193) were seropositive, including 52% (13/25) with neutralising antibodies. Risk factors for
SARS-CoV-2 antibody positivity included contact with a confirmed case (RR 25.2; 95% CI 1445), being
female (RR 2.5; 95% CI 1.06.0) and two-person shared bathroom (RR 2.6; 95% CI 1.16.4).
Interpretation: We identified high rates of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection. Public Health control meas-
ures can mitigate spread but virus re-introduction from asymptomatic individuals remains a risk. Most sero-
positive individuals had neutralising antibodies and infectious virus was not recovered from anyone with
neutralising antibodies.
Funding: PHE
Crown Copyright © 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)hani).
er Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)1. Introduction
In the United Kingdom (UK), the first imported cases of Coronavi-
rus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) were identified in late January 2020
and the number of cases increased rapidly from mid-March 2020,
peaking in mid-April before declining gradually thereafter [1]. Lon-
don was one of the earliest and most affected regions in the UK [2]. A
characteristic of the COVID-19 pandemic has been its propensity tocause large outbreaks in enclosed settings, including the military
[35]. In one London Army barracks, the Regimental Medical Officer
(RMO) identified 36 Army personnel who had developed symptoms
consistent with the contemporaneous COVID-19 case definition dur-
ing the 30 days prior to 16 March 2020. Given the well-described
risks of rapid spread of respiratory infections in military personnel in
enclosed societies [6]. the RMO and Public Health England (PHE)
declared a potential outbreak and implemented stringent social dis-
tancing and infection control measures within the barracks, including
isolation of all symptomatic personnel and their close contacts. PHE,
in collaboration with the RMO, Army Public Health team and
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed with the terms “COVID-19 outbreak” or
“SARS-CoV-2 outbreak” and “Army” or “military” to identify
publications relating to COVID-19 outbreaks in military settings
in the English Language between 01 January and 30 September
2020, focusing particularly on those where enhanced outbreak
investigations were undertaken. Large outbreaks of COVID-19
have been reported in closed institutional settings such as care
homes, prisons, detention centres and even cruise ships, but
there are limited data on COVID-19 outbreaks in military set-
tings, mainly reporting outbreak mitigation strategies through
strict social distancing measures.
Added value of this study
We initiated one of the first outbreak investigations in Army
barracks early in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic in Lon-
don, England, and monitored the course of the outbreak until
its resolution 5 weeks later. We identified high rates of asymp-
tomatic infection, more so among females than males, and spe-
cific risk factors for infection in Army personnel. We have
explored the relationship of neutralising antibodies to the
recovery of infectious virus, as a proxy for infectiousness.
Implications of all the available evidence
Within the Army barracks where most personnel were healthy
young white adults, asymptomatic individuals are likely to play
an important role in spreading the virus. Those with neutralis-
ing antibodies did not have infectious virus even if RT-PCR posi-
tive. Neutralising antibodies are likely to be a relevant correlate
of protective immunity.
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the first of its kind during the COVID-19 pandemic in England. All
adult Army personnel, their families and civilians working in the
Army barracks on 30 March 2020 were invited to have nasal and
throat swabs and blood samples taken with repeat testing 5 weeks
later.
The aim of the investigation was to assess the spread and progres-
sion of SARS-CoV-2 infection and to monitor the development and
progress of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies in symptomatic and asymptom-
atic personnel in a single barracks experiencing a COVID-19 outbreak.
Potential risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection and antibody positivity
as well as functional activity of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies were also
assessed as part of the investigation.2. Methods
2.1. Setting
The Army barracks is a compact living and working environment,
home to approximately 440 regular establishment users. It comprises
of 300 soldiers, 70 musicians, some family dependents and civilians
and contractors. Around 200 personnel live on site, either with fami-
lies, or colleagues in single or shared flats, often with shared bath-
rooms. There are communal dining facilities and social areas, and
only two points of regular entry and exit to the site. Working routines
involve a mix of different indoor and outdoor activities within the
barracks and around London. All civilians and around 70 Army per-
sonnel live off-site in London.2.2. Outbreak investigation
All Army personnel, adult family members and civilians linked to
the Army barracks were invited to participate in the enhanced sur-
veillance on 30 March 2020. The same participants were invited for
repeat investigations 36 days later. All mitigation measures recom-
mended by Army Public Health and PHE on the 16 March 2020 have
continued , along with additional enhanced cleaning regimes and,
where possible, working from home, thereby reducing population
density at the site. Nine personnel who were self-isolating with
COVID-19 symptoms at the first visit were excluded. Because of lim-
ited availability of SARS-CoV-2 testing during the early phase of the
pandemic, the diagnosis was not confirmed in these individuals and,
since they did not take part in the initial investigations, they were
also not invited for the second visit.
By the second visit, 45 Army personnel had self-isolated because
they were symptomatic or close contacts of a symptomatic case, with
one individual requiring hospital admission. The timelines for symp-
tomatic cases and clusters are described in an epidemiological curve.
Additional data on accommodation block and occupational group
were collected as part of the outbreak investigation and used to sup-
port the implementation of targeted infection control measures in
the barracks. Close contact of a confirmed case was defined as accord-
ing to national guidance [7]. All participants from the first visit were
invited for the second visit.
Investigations were performed in a large on-site gymnasium with
small groups and socially distanced arrivals to optimise flow. Follow-
ing written informed consent, participants completed a short ques-
tionnaire on demographics, living arrangements, contacts and
symptoms in the past month. The participants took their own nasal
swabs (both nostrils) under guided and witnessed supervision and
the throat swab and blood sample (~10 mls) were taken by the inves-
tigating team. Nasal self-swabs are less invasive and quicker to
obtain, with less potential for coughing, sneezing or gagging and
have similar sensitivities for detecting SARS-CoV-2 RNA as nasopha-
ryngeal swabs [8]. The samples were transported to PHE where they
were processed and stored until testing.
2.3. Laboratory testing
Nucleic acid was extracted from nasal and throat swab samples
and analysed by a real-time reverse transcription (RT) PCR assay tar-
geting a conserved region of the open reading frame of the ORF 1ab
gene of SARS CoV-2 as previously described [9], together with detec-
tion of an assay internal control to monitor the extraction and RT-
PCR processes. SARS-CoV-2 positive samples with a cycle threshold
(Ct) value of <35 were subjected to virus isolation on Vero E6 cells
swabs and virus detection was confirmed by cytopathic effect (CPE)
up to 14 days after inoculation [10].
Serum samples were analysed for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies by indi-
rect ELISA using England 2/2020 CoV as the viral antigen. The assay
format compares the reactivity to native viral proteins expressed
within a SARS-Cov-2 infected mammalian cell lysate with that of
uninfected control cells. Assay cut-offs were previously determined
by validation studies against panels of known seronegative human
populations and blood taken prior to 2020 [11,12]. Antibodies titres
>0.5 were considered to be positive and 0.350.5 as equivocal.
SARS-CoV-2 (isolate England/02/2020) specific neutralising antibody
levels were measured using a modification of the WHO influenza
micro-neutralisation methodology [13].
Whole genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on samples
using reverse transcription and PCR amplification of extracted viral
RNA with a PCR CT value <33 [14]. Viral amplicons were sequenced
using Illumina library preparation kits (Nextera) and sequenced on
Illumina short-read sequencing machines. Raw sequence data was
trimmed and aligned against a SARS-CoV2 reference genome
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base derived from the reference alignment. Consensus sequences
were collated from each sample, assessed for quality and then aligned
(mafft). Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees were derived from
sequence alignments using IQtree.
2.4. Statistical analysis
As this was an outbreak investigation, sample size was deter-
mined by the population size in the barracks on the day of each visit.
Completed paper questionnaires at each visit were entered into a
bespoke Microsoft Access database (Microsoft Corporation, WA)
and electronically linked with SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR and antibody
results within PHE. Any missing information was followed-up with
the RMO in the barracks and/or completed at the second investiga-
tion visit. At the end of the investigation, the complete dataset was
transferred to Stata v15.0 (StataCorp, Texas) for analysis. Risk factors
and symptoms were assessed as categorical variables with propor-
tions positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA and antibodies and compared by
calculating relative risks and proportional risk differences, along with
95% confidence intervals (because of relatively rare outcome events).
Data were not adjusted for multiple comparisons in the univariate
analyses. Multivariable logistic regression was performed to assess
the interaction of gender and symptoms following the univariable
analysis. The risk was then calculated for the stratification of asymp-
tomatic cases by gender. A full list of variables considered can be
found in the Questionnaire (Supplement S1).
Ethics approval
The investigation protocol was approved by the PHE Research
Ethics and Governance Group (REGG Ref: NR191, 27 March 2020).
Funding
This study was internally funded by PHE  which is a public body
and an executive agency of the Department of Health  as part of the
COVID-19 response. The authors had sole responsibility for the studyFig. 1. SARS-CoV-2 antibody positivity by RT-PCR status at visit 1 in particdesign, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, and writing
of the report. The authors are employed by PHE or the Ministry of
Defence within the Army Medical Services. SNL and MZ had full
access to all the data in the study and final responsibility for the deci-
sion to submit for publication.
3. Results
The first round of the Army barracks investigation involved 304
participants, who all completed a questionnaire, 302 provided a nasal
swab, 301 a throat swab and 285 a blood sample (Fig. 1). Participants
included Army personnel (n = 254, 85%), their family members
(n = 10, 3%) and civilians (n = 36, 12%), and the majority were male
(n = 247, 81%); four participants did not declare status. Their demo-
graphics are summarised in Table 3 & Supplement S2. During the
first visit, 24 (8%) participants had a positive throat swab for SARS-
CoV-2, of whom 11 also were positive on nose swab (Supplement
S3). Infectious virus was recovered from 7/24 (29%) participants,
mainly from nose swabs (n = 6/7). Serological investigations identi-
fied 28 participants with detectable SARS-CoV-2 IgG antibodies,
including 19 (7%) seropositive and 9 in the equivocal range. Among
these 28 individuals, 12/19 (63%) and 4/9 (44%), respectively, had
neutralising antibodies.
At the second visit 36 days later, 193 (64%) participants returned.
Loss to follow-up was primarily due to essential military taskings as
well as instructions to work from home where possible. All 193 com-
pleted a second questionnaire and provided a nose swab and blood
sample and 192 had a throat swab taken. Of these, 28 participants
(15%) had detectable SARS-CoV-2 antibodies, including 25 (13%) posi-
tive and 3 in the equivocal range, with 13/25 (52%) and 0/3, respec-
tively, having neutralising antibodies. No one tested on the second
visit remained RT-PCR positive for SARS-CoV-2 and none were newly
positive for the virus.
All participants who were SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR positive for infec-
tion in visit 1 were SARS-CoV-2 antibody positive at visit 2, and most
of those with SARS-CoV-2 antibodies at the first visit had an increase
in IgG and neutralising antibody levels (Fig. 2). Those who were RT-
PCR positive in visit 1 were more likely to be seropositive than thoseipants COVID-19 outbreak investigation in a London Army barracks.
Fig. 2. Changes in IgG and Neutralising antibody levels on a log scale with lines of equivalence.
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however, had neutralising antibodies (Fig. 2). Nine participants at
visit 1 were both RT-PCR and SARS-CoV-2 antibody positive. No par-
ticipant from whom infectious virus was recovered had neutralising
antibodies at the same time (Fig. 3).
Around two-thirds of participants (22/34, 64%) with positive RT-
PCR or SARS-CoV-2 antibodies were asymptomatic. New onset symp-
toms were only seen in RT-PCR positive participants, while SARS-
CoV-2 antibodies  and more specifically neutralising antibodies 
were identified mainly in those who had been symptomatic prior to
testing (Supplement S4).Fig. 3. Venn diagrams showing interaction of RT-PCR results and serology outcomes of3.1. Outbreak evolution and progression
Concerns of an outbreak at the Army barracks were first raised on
16 March, by which time 36 Army personnel had reported symptoms
consistent with COVID-19, including 11 had self-isolated in line with
national guidance since 12 March. These 11 Army personnel attended
the first investigation visit and 10/11 also attended the second visit.
Seven of these 11 symptomatic personnel had evidence of COVID-19
exposure, either through RT-PCR, antibody detection or both. One
individual who was PCR and antibody negative on both occasions
had confirmed picornavirus infection.participants during a COVID-19 outbreak investigation in a London Army barracks.
Fig. 4. Epidemiological curve of possible and confirmed cases during a COVID-19 outbreak investigation in a London Army barracks.
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fied at 2 week intervals from 6 weeks prior to the first day of
testing (Fig. 4). The first two clusters occurred prior to the imple-
mentation of self-isolation for symptomatic cases. The third clus-
ter was spread across eight days, predominately affecting those
living on-site, and moving from a group of musicians (who
accounted for two-thirds of cases in the third cluster) to other
personnel who also lived on-site. This third symptomatic cluster
started at the same time as infection control measures were
introduced on 12th March 2020 which was associated with a
rapid reduction in the interval between symptom onset and time
to self-isolation (Supplement S5). Following the final case in the
third cluster, there were no further cases in the barracks for
14 days until the fourth cluster started on the day of testing,
likely introduced by individuals living off-site.3.2. Whole genome sequencing (WGS)
All 24 RT-PCR positive samples with Ct <33 were subjected to
WGS and 17 sequences were obtained (Supplement S6). WGS indi-
cated multiple different introductions, likely between 6 and 9, of the
virus into the barracks, two of which were associated with clusters of
4 cases with genetically indistinguishable SARS-CoV-2 strains. These
two clusters each included symptomatic individuals who were part
of the final symptomatic cluster which started on the day of the first
sampling visit (Fig. 4). The four individuals in one of these clusters all
worked in the same department within the barracks. The remaining
cases, included eight other individuals infected with strains that had
less than 3 base differences, were all asymptomatic and with only a
workplace connection between them, indicating silent transmission
within the barracks.3.3. Gender
Females were 2.5 (95% CI, 1.06.0) times more likely to be anti-
body positive than males, and, in the multivariable logistic regression
analysis, there was an interaction with risk of a positive test being
even higher in females who were asymptomatic (P = 0.032). On strati-
fication of asymptomatic participants by gender, asymptomatic
female were 6.5 (95% CI, 1.922.1) times more likely to be positive
than asymptomatic males (Tables 1 & 2a).
3.4. Smoking
Information on smoking was limited by low response rates.
Where recorded, however, smokers were less likely to have a positive
RT-PCR for SARS-CoV-2 (1/9 [11%] vs 23/34 [68%]; P = 0.005) com-
pared to non-smokers, and none of the smokers were positive on
nose swab or had live virus isolated from a throat swab, or had neu-
tralising antibodies at the first or second visit.
3.5. Symptoms
Fever and cough were associated with SARS-CoV-2 antibody posi-
tivity at visit 1, as well as ageusia and anosmia, but since the latter
symptoms were not part of the initial case definition for COVID-19
and because of limited testing at the time, these cases did not self-
isolate (Tables 2a & b).
3.6. Close contact with a confirmed case
Close contacts of a confirmed case of COVID-19 were 7.3 (95% CI,
3.316.5), 25.2 (95% CI, 14.045.0) and 3.2 (95% CI, 1.76.0) times
more likely to be RT-PCR positive, SARS-CoV-2 IgG antibody positive
and neutralising antibody positive, respectively, compared to those
Table 1
Factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR positivity in Visit 1 during a COVID-19 outbreak investigation in a London Army
barracks.
Demographic variable PCR-positivity (Visit 1)
Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95%
CI)
Gender
Female 7/57 (12%) 1.8 (0.8 to 4.1) 0.05 (-0.04 to 0.2)
Male 17/245 (7%) Baseline
Shared bedroom
Yes 9/128 (7%) 0.8 (0.4 to 1.9) - 0.01 (-0.08 to 0.05)
No 14/166 (8%) Baseline
Shared bathroom
Yes 22/271 (8%) 1.2 (0.3 to 4.9) 0.01 (-0.08 to 0.1)
No 2/30 (7%) Baseline
Bathroom shared with one other Army Colleague
Yes 14/115 (12%) 2.4 (1.1 to 5.4) 0.07 (0.003 to 0.1)
No 9/179 (5%) Baseline
Close contact with a confirmed case
Yes 4/8 (50%) 7.3 (3.3 to 16.5) 0.4 (0.08 to 0.8)
No 20/293 (7%) Baseline
Smoke or Vape (limited data available)
Yes 1/9 (11%) 0.2 (0.03 to 1.1) -0.5 (-0.8 to -0.3)
No 22/34 (65%) Baseline
Asymptomatic cases by gender
Asymptomatic Female 5/42 (12%) 1.8 (0.7 to 4.8) 0.05 (-0.05 to 0.2)
Asymptomatic Male 12/180 (7%) Baseline
Symptomatic cases by gender
Symptomatic Female 2/15 (13% 1.7 (0.4 to 8.1) 0.06 (-0.1 to 0.2)
Symptomatic Male 5/65 (8%) Baseline
Symptom Variable PCR-positivity
Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI)
Any Symptoms
Yes 7/80 (9%) 1.1 (0.5 to 2.7) 0.01 (-0.06 to 0.08)
No 17/222 (8%) Baseline
Fever
Yes 3/27 (11%) 1.5 (0.5 to 4.6) 0.03 (-0.09 to 0.2)
No 21/275 (8%) Baseline
Cough
Yes 4/46 (9%) 1.1 (0.4 to 3.1) 0.008 (-0.08 to 0.09)
No 20/256 (8%) Baseline
Anosmia (Loss of Smell)
Yes 2/7 (29%) 3.8 (1.1 to 13.2) 0.2 (-0.1 to 0.6)
No 22/295 (7%) Baseline
Ageusia (Loss of Taste)
Yes 2/6 (33%) 4.5 (1.5 to 15) 0.3 (-0.1 to 0.6)
No 22/296 (7%) Baseline
Army/civilian/family status is not included as the results are confounded by the transmission dynamics of the virus through the
barracks with civilians most likely to have recent infection and Army personnel previous infection.
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(Tables 1 & 2a). In total, 24 participants were close contacts of a con-
firmed case; 8 were household contacts, including two who had a
personal/social contact, and 16 had close contact (<2 metres) with a
confirmed case for >15 minutes, including 13 who had only contact
through the workplace.3.7. Accommodation factors
SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR positivity or antibody detection was not asso-
ciated with the number of individuals in shared collegial or family
settings. Personnel who shared a bathroom with just one other col-
league compared to any other number, were 2.4 (95% CI; 1.15.4)
and 2.6 (95% CI; 1.16.4) times more likely to be PCR and antibody
positive, respectively (Tables 1 & 2a). These results remained similar
when adjusting for gender (data not shown).4. Discussion
In one of the first COVID-19 outbreak investigations under-
taken in England, we found evidence of asymptomatic infection
and transmission among Army personnel and civilians in a Lon-
don barracks. Through detailed epidemiological, laboratory and
genomic investigations, we identified the potential source of
infection into the barracks and monitored its progression before
and after implementation of strict infection control measures on
16 March 2020. We found that nasal swabs were less likely to be
RT-PCR positive for SARS-CoV-2 than throat swabs but more
likely to have higher viral loads with lower RT-PCR cycle thresh-
old values and more likely to have live virus isolated, suggesting
a greater risk for transmission to others.. PCR-testing provided a
point prevalence for SARS-CoV-2 infection but significantly
underestimated the extent and spread of infection within the bar-
racks when compared to serology, as has been noted in other
Table 2a
Factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 IgG and Neutralising antibody positivity in Visit 1.
Variable IgG Antibody positivity (Visit 1) Neutralising Antibody positivity (Visit 1)
Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI) Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI)
Gender
Female 7/54 (13%) 2.5 (1.0 to 6.0) 0.08 (-0.02 to 0.2) 9/15 (60%) 2.2 (1 to 4.7) 0.3 (0.03 to 0.6)
Male 12/231 (5%) Baseline 7/26 (27%) Baseline
Shared Bedroom
Yes 8/119 (7%) 1.0 (0.4 to 2.3) -0.002 (-0.06 to 0.06) 7/14 (50%) 1.4 (0.7 to 2.9) 0.1 (-0.2 to 0.5)
No 11/159 (7%) Baseline 9/25 (36%) Baseline
Shared Bathroom
Yes 19/257 (8%) _ 0.08 (0.04 to 0.1) 15/36 (42%) 2 (0.3 to 12.5) 0.2 (-0.2 to 0.6)
No 0/28 (0%) Baseline 1/5 (20%) Baseline
Bathroom shared with one other Army Colleague
Yes 12/110 (11%) 2.6 (1.1 to 6.4) 0.07 (0.002 to 0.1) 11/22 (50%) 1.7 (0.7 to 4) 0.2 (-0.09 to 0.5)
No 7/168 (4%) Baseline 5/17 (29%) Baseline
Close contact with a confirmed case
Yes 8/8 (100%) 25.2 (14.0 to 45.0) 0.96 (0.9 to 0.98) 7/8 (88%) 3.2 (1.7 to 6.0) 0.6 (0.3 to 0.9)
No 11/277 (4%) Baseline 9/33 (27%) Baseline
Smoke or Vape (limited data available)
Yes 3/9 (33%) 0.7 (0.3 to 1.8) -0.2 (-0.5 to 0.2) 0/4 NA -0.5 (-0.6 to -0.3)
No 16/33 (48%) Baseline 13/28 (46%) Baseline
Asymptomatic cases by gender
Asymptomatic Female 6/39 (15%) 6.5 (1.9 to 22.1) 0.1 (0.01 to 0.2) 8/12 (67%) 3.8 (1.3 to 11.4) 0.5 (0.2 to 0.8)
Asymptomatic Male 4/170 (2%) Baseline 3/17 (18%) Baseline
Symptomatic cases by gender
Symptomatic Female 1/15 (7%) 0.5 (0.1 to 3.8) -0.06 (-0.2 to 0.09) 1/3 (33%) 0.8 (0.1 to 4.4) -0.1 (-0.7 to 0.5)
Symptomatic Male 8/61 (13%) Baseline 4/9 (44%) Baseline
Symptom Variable IgG Antibody positivity Neutralising Antibody positivity
Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI) Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI)
Any Symptoms
Yes 9/76 (12%) 2.5 (1 to 5.9) 0.07 (-0.01 to 0.2) 5/12 (42%) 1.1 (0.5 to 2.5) 0.04 (-0.2 to 0.4)
No 10/209 (5%) Baseline 11/29 (38%) Baseline
Fever
Yes 6/26 (23%) 4.6 (1.9 to 11.1) 0.2 (0.02 to 0.3) 5/7 (71%) 2.2 (1.2 to 4.3) 0.39 (0.02 to 0.8)
No 13/259 (5%) Baseline 11/34 (32%) Baseline
Cough
Yes 6/44 (14%) 2.5 (1 to 6.3) 0.08 (-0.02 to 0.2) 3/8 (38%) 1 (0.4 to 2.6) - 0.02 (-0.4 to 0.4)
No 13/241 (5%) Baseline 13/33 (39%) Baseline
Anosmia (Loss of Smell)
Yes 3/7 (43%) 7.4 (2.8 to 19.8) 0.4 (0.004 to 0.7) 2/4 (50%) 1.3 (0.5 to 3.8) 0.1 (-0.4 to 0.6)
No 16/278 (6%) Baseline 14/37 (38%) Baseline
Ageusia (Loss of Taste)
Yes 4/6 (67%) 12.4 (5.9 to 26.2) 0.6 (0.2 to 0.99) 3/5 (60%) 1.7 (0.7 to 3.8) 0.2 (-0.2 to 0.7)
No 15/279 (5%) Baseline 13/36 (36%) Baseline
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2 RT-PCR and antibody positive but, importantly, we were unable
to isolate infectious virus from anyone who had neutralising anti-
bodies.
The Army barracks outbreak provided a unique opportunity to
understand infection and transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Within
this high-density and a relatively closed community, we found
that 14% of individuals were positive on RT-PCR or serology at
the first visit. SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence (7%) was around 5-fold
higher than estimated for London at the time (Week 13) [2].
SARS-CoV-2 infection rates, however, were substantially lower
than reported for outbreaks in other institutional settings such as
care homes [11], ships [16], homeless shelters [17,18], detention
centres [19], and prisons [20]. Reassuringly, early implementation
of social distancing measures successfully mitigated the outbreak,
as reported in other military settings [35]. By the second visit,
36 days later (Week 19), SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence in the bar-
racks was 12.9% compared to 14.8% in London overall [2]. Seros-
urveillance and symptomatic cluster contact mapping suggest
that internal transmission can be controlled, but WGS, highlights
the difficulties of preventing new introductions from external
community.4.1. Neutralising antibodies and live virus isolation
At the time of testing, the Army personnel were at different stages
of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Some had active infection, while others had
recovered and were antibody positive. Nine individuals, however,
tested positive for both the virus and serum SARS-CoV-2 antibodies.
Notably, though, these personnel either had live virus isolated or
neutralising antibodies, but not both. This is consistent with a recent
report of a strong inverse association between serum neutralising
antibodies and isolation of live virus from the respiratory tract of
patients with confirmed COVID-19 [21], indicating that individuals
with neutralising antibodies are unlikely to be infectious to others.
In our cohort, all RT-PCR positive individuals showed a serological
response emphasising the clear relationship between virus detection
and an adaptive host immune response, a point which had been
uncertain early in the pandemic. Not all symptomatic individuals,
however, had SARS-CoV-2 infection based on RT-PCR or serology
testing, highlighting the lack of specificity of clinical case definitions.
Additionally, some seropositive participants did not have neutralising
antibodies. It is possible that they might be protected through cellular
immune responses [22,23], but we did not investigate this in our
cohort.
Table 2b
Factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 IgG and Neutralising antibody positivity in Visit 2.
Variable IgG Antibody positivity (Visit 2) Neutralising Antibody positivity (Visit 2)
Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI) Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI)
Gender
Female 5/37 (14%) 1.1 (0.4 to 2.6) 0.007 (-0.1 to 0.1) 2/6 (33%) 0.7 (0.2 to 2.2) -0.2 (-0.6 to 0.3)
Male 20/156 (13%) Baseline 11/22 (50%) Baseline
Shared Bedroom
Yes 7/87 (8%) 0.5 (0.2 to 1.0) -0.09 (-0.2 to -0.003) 5/8 (63%) 1.6 (0.7 to 3.3) 0.23 (-0.2 to 0.6)
No 18/102 (18%) Baseline 8/20 (40%) Baseline
Shared Bathroom
Yes 22/172 (13%) 0.9 (0.3 to 2.7) -0.01 (-0.2 to 0.1) 11/24 (46%) 0.9 (0.3 to 2.7) -0.04 (-0.6 to 0.5)
No 3/21 (14%) Baseline 2/4 (50%) Baseline
Bathroom shared with one other Army Colleague
Yes 16/72 (22%) 2.9 (1.3 to 6.2) 0.2 (0.04 to 0.3) 8/17 (47%) 1 (0.5 to 2.4) 0.02 (-0.4 to 0.4)
No 9/117 (8%) Baseline 5/11 (45%) Baseline
Smoke or Vape (limited data available)
Yes 3/8 (38%) 0.5 (0.2-1.2) -0.4(-0.8 to -0.1) 0/3 NA -0.7 (-0.9 to -0.5)
No 17/21 (81%) Baseline 12/17 (71%) Baseline
Asymptomatic cases by gender
Asymptomatic Female 5/29 (17%) 2.1 (0.8 to 5.7) 0.1 (-0.6 to 0.2) 2/6 (33%) 0.6 (0.2 to 2.1) -0.2 (-0.7 to 0.3)
Asymptomatic Male 9/109 (8%) Baseline 6/11 (55%) Baseline
Symptomatic cases by gender
Symptomatic Female 0/8 (0%) NA -0.2 (-0.4 to -0.1) 0/0 NA NA
Symptomatic Male 11/47 (23%) Baseline 5/11 (45%) Baseline
Close contact with a confirmed case
Yes 5/5 (100%) 9.4 (6.2 to 14.2) 0.9 (0.8 to 0.94) 3/5 (60%) 1.4 (0.6 to 3.2) 0.17 (-0.3 to 0.6)
No 20/188 (11%) Baseline 10/23 (43%) Baseline
Symptom Variable IgG Antibody positivity Neutralising Antibody positivity
Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI) Risk RR (95% CI) Risk Difference (95% CI)
Any Symptoms
Yes 11/55 (20%) 1.98 (0.96 to 4.1) 0.1 (-0.02 to 0.2) 5/11 (45%) 0.97 (0.4 to 2.2) -0.02 (-0.4 to 0.4)
No 14/138 (10%) Baseline 8/17 (47%) Baseline
Fever
Yes 6/20 (30%) 2.7 (1.2 to 6.0) 0.2 (-0.02 to 0.4) 4/6 (67%) 1.6 (0.8 to 3.5) 0.3 (-0.2 to 0.7)
No 19/173 (11%) Baseline 9/22 (40%) Baseline
Cough
Yes 9/33 (27%) 2.7 (1.3 to 5.6) 0.2 (0.1 to 0.3) 4/9 (44%) 0.9 (0.4 to 2.2) -0.03 (-0.4 to 0.4)
No 16/160 (10%) Baseline 9/19 (47%) Baseline
Anosmia (Loss of Smell)
Yes 2/5 (40%) 3.3 (1.0 to 10.2) 0.3 (-0.2 to 0.7) 0/2 (0%) _ -0.5 (-0.7 to -0.3)
No 23/188 (12%) Baseline 13/26 (50%) Baseline
Ageusia (Loss of Taste)
Yes 3/4 (75%) 6.4 (3.2 to 12.8) 0.6 (0.2 to 1.1) 1/3 (33%) 0.7 (0.1 to 3.6) -0.1 (-0.7 to 0.4)
No 22/189 (12%) Baseline 12/25 (48%) Baseline
Army/civilian/family status is not included as the results are confounded by the transmission dynamics of the virus through the barracks with civilians
most likely to have recent infection and Army personnel with previous infection.
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Nearly two-thirds of personnel who were either RT-PCR or
antibody positive or both were asymptomatic throughout their
infection, which highlights the high degree of heterogeneity in
the clinical spectrum of COVID-19 in different age-groups and
populations [24]. We isolated infectious virus from asymptomatic
individuals [11,25], demonstrating their potential to transmit the
infection [26]. Additionally, although <10% of participants were
females, they were significantly more likely to be asymptomatic
and become antibody positive than males. A gender difference in
asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 has not been reported [24,27], but
universal screening of pregnant women found that the vast
majority of SARS-CoV-2 positive women were asymptomatic [28].
In symptomatic personnel, fever and respiratory tract symptoms
were the most common symptoms, although anosmia and ageusia
had only just been identified as possible manifestations of COVID-
19 and were not included in the case definition at the time [29],
which may partly have contributed to ongoing transmission
within the barracks [30].4.3. Risk factors
We identified other risk factors for COVID-19. Musicians
accounted for two-thirds of personnel in the third symptomatic clus-
ter, flagging concerns of potential aerosol transmission from brass
and woodwind instruments [31]. In this group, however, there were
other potential explanations including exposure to a community
source at a local event and personal/household/social contact with a
confirmed case, which was identified in 7 of the 8 musicians. We also
identified sharing a bathroom with one person as another risk factor,
highlighting the importance of ventilating and cleaning shared ablu-
tions, particularly in complex accommodation settings. The increased
risk among two persons sharing a bathroom could be due to aerosol
generation in smaller bathroom spaces following oral hygiene and/or
physical contact through sharing of sinks. Smokers had a low risk of
SARS-CoV-2 infection and antibody positivity but the poor response
for this question precludes any firm conclusions, although other large
population-based studies have also reported significantly lower odds
of SARS-CoV-2 positivity among active smokers compared to non-
smokers [32].
Table 3
Key demographics of 304 participant at visit 1.
Demographics of 304 Participants
Age n= 302
Median IQR Range















COVID-19 close contact (n=303)
No 283 (93%)
Yes 20 (7%)









Further details are contained in Supplement Table S2.
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The strength of this investigation lies in the rapidity of initiating
the outbreak investigation during a period of high community trans-
mission in London and the high participation rate. The findings of
this outbreak are likely to be applicable to other similar shared living
situations such as university dormitories, prisons and care homes,
although the investigation involved a single Army barracks where
participants were mainly young white healthy men.
Other potential biases include higher participation rates among
those were directly affected by COVID-19 and exclusion of symptom-
atic personnel who were self-isolating at visit 1; the former may
overestimate an effect size, whilst the latter may underestimate it.
Other potential limitations include the limited sensitivity of RT-
PCR tests for SARS-CoV-2 and the lack of correlates for antibody pro-
tection against infection and re-infection. We also did not measure
cellular immune responses in our cohort. Additionally, we relied on
participant recall for symptom onset and timing, most of whom were
not tested for SARS-CoV-2 infection prior to the investigation. At least
some reported illnesses were likely due to other viruses, as
highlighted by the picornavirus infection in one participant and,
therefore, the true rate of asymptomatic infection may be underesti-
mated.
5. Conclusions
Army barracks are a high-risk, high-density complex setting at
increased risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and outbreaks. Potential
risk factors for transmission included contact with a confirmed case,
fomite transmission in indoor settings and specifically two-person
shared ablutions. We identified high rates of asymptomatic infection,
especially in women, and asymptomatic spread within the barracks
through identification of genetically indistinguishable strains among
Army personnel. Importantly, we demonstrated that individualscould be SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR and antibody positive, but those with
neutralising antibodies did not have infectious virus isolates even if
RT-PCR positive and were, therefore, potentially not infectious to
others.
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